The Zairian army evaluated through its operations in Angola/ El ejército del Zaire evaluado a través de sus operaciones en Angola

Special commands in Ambriz. From left to rigth: Lieutenant Paes -will die at the Battle of Quifangondo; Simoes driver was injured in Quifangondo, Captain Marangoni, and benhind, Remedios, wounded and captured in Quifangondo.

Friend Terry Aspinall friend makes us get a comment from Commander Pedro Marangoni regarding military intervention in Zaire in Angola:

In 1975 Mobutu sent to Angola the best he had in terms of soldiers, Commanded by Colonel Mamina. They showed in the first few months that they were mostly incompetent, undisciplined, cowardly, looters and rapists. Engineering: They built a wooden floating bridge in Portoquipiri, to help the offensive against Luanda. However, the bridge collapsed with the first rains and left my group isolated on the hill at Cal. Later they replaced it by building a large steel bridge in the same position. However, during the withdrawal of our forces, they also attached hundreds of pounds of explosives to it, but were unable to make it explode. Cavalry: They had Panhard 90 and 60; away from the enemy they quickly unload of all their ammunition and returned to the rear to “recharge”. When withdrawing, the Zairian Panhard and other vehicles were unable to shoot because they were loaded up with products they had looted: bicycles, refrigerators, furniture, etc. Infantry: The troops of occupation, fled as the first shots from enemy were fired, some even deserted which gave us more problems than we were receiving from the enemy. Simulated mortar attacks were placed in dangerous positions in order that we could retreat. The casualties suffered in the Battle of Quifangondo was because Coronel Mamina gave no defense or protection to two trucks full of soldiers, who were following the Portuguese special commandos Panhards. It was impossible to flee, as they were under heavy machine fire. Those who could fled immediately. All the time they were in Angola they tried to remove the white FNLA to break free of their demands. In short, the Zairian soldiers sent to Angola in 1975, for the most part, (other than a few notable exceptions) were just a tribal armed bunch.

————–

El amigo Terry Aspinall nos hace llegar un comentario del Comandante Pedro Marangoni en relación con la intervención del ejército de Zaire en Angola:

En 1975, Mobutu envió a Angola lo mejor que había en términos de soldados, al mando del coronel Mamina. Ellos demostraron en los primeros meses que la mayoría eran incompetentes, indisciplinados, cobardes, ladrones y violadores. De Ingeniería: Se construyó un puente flotante de madera en Portoquipiri, para ayudar a la ofensiva en contra de Luanda. Sin embargo, el puente se derrumbó con las primeras lluvias y dejó a mi grupo aislado en la colina en Cal. Más tarde se sustituyó por la construcción de un puente grande de acero en la misma posición. Sin embargo, durante la retirada de nuestras fuerzas, se le adjuntaron cientos de kilos de explosivos, pero no pudieron hacerlo explotar. Caballería: Habían Panhard 90 y 60, que lejos del enemigo descargaban rápidamente todas sus municiones y regresaban a la retaguardia para «recargar». Cuando se retiraban, los Panhard y otros vehículosde Zaire no pudieron disparar porque estaban cargados con productos que habían saqueado: bicicletas, refrigeradores, muebles, etc. Infantería: Las tropas de ocupación, huyeron con los primeros disparos del enemigo, los que desertaban nos daban incluso más problemas que el enemigo. Las bajas sufridas en la Batalla de Quifangondo se debieron a que el Coronel Mamina no dio defensa o protección a dos camiones llenos de soldados, que estaban siguiendo a los comandos especiales portugueses en los Panhards. Les fue imposible huir, ya que cayeron bajo el fuego de ametralladoras pesadas. Los que pudieron huyeron de inmediato. Todo el tiempo que estuvieron en Angola, que trataron de apartar a los blancos del FNLA para liberarse de sus demandas. En resumen, los soldados que Zaire envió a Angola en 1975, en su mayor parte, (excepto unas pocas excepciones notables) eran sólo un grupo tribal armado.